



Weapons of Another Kind: Henry Thomas Buckle and the Case of
Thomas Pooley
Ian Hesketh – Queen’s University 
All this rush’d with his blood—Shall he expire
And unavenged? Arise! Ye Goths, and glut your ire!
—Lord Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage (1812–18)1
These words were carefully transcribed in a notebook of poetry that was among
the historian Henry Thomas Buckle’s belongings when he died of typhoid fever
while travelling throughout the Middle East in 1862. He was just forty years old.
Buckle had copied out whole sections of Canto IV of Byron’s Childe Harold begin-
ning with No. 140 and the lines: “I see before me the Gladiator lie: / Consents to
death, but conquers agony”. Buckle clearly related to the dying gladiator. He was
himself fighting with death throughout the last few years of his life in order to
complete a massive project on the History of Civilization in England (1857–61), of
which he would only publish two introductory volumes of a projected ten. He
could also relate to the gladiator because he often wrote as if he was engaged in a
long struggle against the forces of superstition that still held (in his mind) too
much power in England, particularly when it came to the writing of history. He
set out in particular to consider the long history of rational progress in England
and sought to avenge those great sceptical individuals of the past who struggled
against what he called the “protective spirit” that sought to hold back the spirit of
reason.
The first volume of his History of Civilization, published in 1857, thrust
the previously unknown Buckle into the limelight. The first edition of 1,500
copies quickly sold out and a second edition of 2,000 copies was promptly print-
ed.2 Though Buckle’s work would rarely be cited beyond the 1860s as among the
important works of day, at the time it sent shock waves through the Victorian psy-
che that would only be matched by the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species two
years later. The literary critic and intellectual historian Leslie Stephen remembered
late in his life that Buckle’s work seemed even more important than Darwin’s at the
time.3 Buckle argued not only that history should become a science, but that it had
to become a science if England was going to reach the final stages of progress.
Buckle argued that in order for that to occur the historian had to stop relying on
unseen forces in the past such as Providence and free will in explaining what actu-
ally happened. The scientific historian must rather rely on the tools of science:
observation, facts, and statistics. Only when the historian accepts that the past is
not governed by supernatural forces but rather by natural laws that can be
observed and explained will history transcend its position as a mere branch of
metaphysics and English society overcome its still powerful backward and protec-
tive spirit.4 While Buckle’s popular work would largely be rejected by a group of
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professionalizing historians adopting a less rigorous form of scientific history, one
concerned with uncovering facts but not laws, it was still well understood that
Buckle’s History of Civilization “exercised an incalculable influence upon the whole
science of history.” As late as 1873, the Westminster Review could still claim that “No
views of history can ever be held again without being affected in one way or
another by that commanding work.”5
While Buckle led a fairly uneventful life until 1857, he was thereafter very
much in the public spotlight. He attended many diner parties among the London
literati, meeting, among others, Darwin, the botanist Joseph Hooker, the evolu-
tionary philosopher Herbert Spencer, the physicist John Tyndall, and the explorer
David Livingstone.6 He was put up for election at the Athenaeum and was almost
blackballed by a contingent of High Church Anglicans. A threat from Darwin’s
future bulldog, Thomas Henry Huxley, that all clergymen put up for election
would be disputed, settled the matter and Buckle was elected with only nine votes
against.7 He also gave a highly publicised lecture at the Royal Institution on the
progressive role women play in society by keeping the deductive spirit alive against
the masculine inductive tendencies of nineteenth-century English science.8 He
even received cards of thanks for an evening of thoughtful discussion from natu-
ralists Robert Owen and Roderick Murchison.9 The most publicised and, indeed,
controversial event of Buckle’s short public life, however, had to do with his pub-
lished discussion of a little-known but recent persecution of blaspheme.
In 1857, Thomas Pooley, a poor well-digger in Liskeard, was arrested and
put on trial for making blasphemous statements. He was subsequently sentenced
to a twenty-one month prison term. When Buckle learned of the trial and discov-
ered that Pooley was clearly “delusional” but hardly a criminal nuisance to his com-
munity, he wrote a widely read critique of the trial that accused the prosecution
and judge of the grossest misconduct of justice. He also, perhaps more impor-
tantly, drew attention to the rarely used law against blasphemy and highlighted the
clear class-based biases that underpinned its persecution.
For Buckle, in defending Pooley, he was also defending the freedom of
expression, a fundamental element of any progressive society. It was in contribut-
ing to the progress of English society that he was attempting to be much like one
of the sceptical heroes of his History of Civilization. His attempt to point out where
the supernatural still held sway in English society went hand in hand with his
attempt to make history a science. Yet there were consequences for so publicly
challenging the ruling of a well-respected judge; he was viciously attacked in the
periodical press for his intervention and even many of his friends questioned his
tone. His reputation would not be forever tarnished by the Pooley controversy,
however. A subsequent generation would find much to admire not just in his
attempt to defend a poor well-sinker against the power of the Crown but also in
his willingness to jeopardize his newly earned reputation as a “scientific” historian
for an unpopular though ultimately just cause. Much like the Enlightenment
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philosophers and historians he greatly admired, Buckle showed quite clearly that if
wielded properly the pen can indeed be mightier than the sword.
The Literary Lion and the Cornish Well Sinker
In 1857, the same year that Buckle became, according to Tyndall, “the literary lion
of the day” in London,10 a poor well-digger in a much more remote part of the
country in Liskeard, Cornwall was arrested and put on trial for blaspheme.
Thomas Pooley, it is safe to say, had some eccentric beliefs. He treated the earth
as if it was a living organism (imagine that!), and was careful when digging his wells
not to penetrate the earth’s surface beyond a certain point, in order to avoid need-
lessly harming some vital organ. He also, and perhaps more relevantly, had some
“infidel” beliefs. He was convinced, for instance, that the Bible in particular was
to blame for the potato-rot that had recently decimated the crops in Cornwall.
Scattering the ashes of burnt Bibles over the rotted fields was Pooley’s contribu-
tion to stemming the seemingly unstoppable act of God.
For a time Pooley’s eccentricities and odd views seemed harmless
enough. He was at the very least well respected by his neighbours for his indus-
triousness. Furthermore, he provided for his family even though they occupied
the lower rung of the social hierarchy, and they very much relied on his ability to
continue earning what he could from well digging. Unfortunately an accident,
which happened to Pooley quite soon before the events in question, seemed to
enhance and amplify his already strange beliefs and behaviour and he became
more outspoken in his unorthodox views. He began writing his heretical views
about the Bible being responsible for the potato-rot on private gates. An adver-
tisement in the 25 April 1857 edition of the Cornish Times requested that “Any per-
son who has seen a man writing blasphemous sentences on gates or other places
in the neighbourhood of Liskeard” should speak to the authorities.11
The man who placed the advertisement was a local clergyman, Rev. Paul
Bush, and he would soon after catch Pooley writing blasphemous statements on
his own gate that supposedly read: “Duloe stinks with the monster Christ’s Bible—
Blasphemy—T. Pooley.” Pooley was ordered to appear before the local magis-
trates on 1 July for publishing blasphemous statements against the Holy Scriptures
and Christianity and was immediately arrested. Upon being arrested Pooley made
the mistake of shouting further blasphemous statements that the only reason
police were necessary was because that “blackguard Jesus Christ … stole the don-
key” becoming “the forerunner of all theft and whoredom.”12 Unfortunately for
Pooley, such statements were duly noted.
Pooley was subsequently tried at the Bodmin assizes on 30 July 1857
before Justice John Taylor Coleridge. The prosecutor happened to be Coleridge’s
son, John Duke Coleridge. Pooley acted in his own defence, as legal representa-
tion was not typically a right afforded to the accused in the nineteenth century.13
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By all accounts the trial was a speedy affair and the jury found Pooley guilty of
blasphemy for both the graffiti on the Rev. Bush’s gate and for his outburst dur-
ing his arrest. When he was sentenced by Justice Coleridge to a twenty-one month
imprisonment Pooley cried out that the judge might as well “put on the black cap
and finish the matter at once”. After spending only a few days in Bodmin goal,
however, Pooley began tearing off his clothes and refusing to eat, at which point
he was transferred to Bodmin insane asylum.14
Much like the rest of the English public, Buckle was completely ignorant
of the case of Thomas Pooley and this despite the attempt to drum up support
for Pooley’s cause by the secularist leader George Jacob Holyoake. Holyoake had
himself been put on trial for blaspheme and had written a well-known memoir
about it. Pooley’s arrest and subsequent trial by jury undoubtedly irritated
Holyoake, no doubt for falsifying the very title of his memoirs, History of the Last
Trial by Jury for Atheism in England (1850), but also because Holyoake had experi-
enced the sharp edge of that little-persecuted law that he believed belonged to a
bygone era of witch hunts and serfdom.
Holyoake published a pamphlet on The Case of Thomas Pooley, the Cornish
Well-Sinker (1857), detailing the arrest and trial. He argued, somewhat unbeliev-
ably, that the entire trial was the result of a conspiracy between the judge, prose-
cutor, and local clergyman—what he called “Bush and Coleridge Christianity”—
to use the power of the state to squash the growing trend of unbelief that threat-
ened to challenge the entire Anglican establishment of England.15 This, of
course, was absurd. Timothy Toohey has convincingly shown that Judge Coleridge
was merely applying the common law on blasphemy as a result of a trial brought
about by a private individual who happened to be a clergyman. He did not seek
out the case in advance as judges could not select the cases heard on assize.
Furthermore, prosecutors also could not choose the assize cases they had to pros-
ecute. Neither judge nor prosecutor would have had any knowledge of the case
before being briefed about it a few days before. The evidence for a “Bush and
Coleridge” clerical conspiracy, then, is thin at best.16
Where Holyoake did have a point, however, was in the failure of judge,
prosecutor, and jury to see that Pooley’s mind was clearly “diseased”.17 While
Pooley did not invoke a plea of insanity in his own defence, the letters he wrote to
his wife while he was awaiting trial in Bodmin goal—which were “read by the
authorities of the goal”—as well as his own well-documented opinions about how
Christianity was out to destroy his family and community, would have been more
than enough evidence in favour of his “delusional” state.18 The nature of
Pooley’s delusions about Christianity were not unlike Daniel McNaughtan’s about
the police, a relatively new institution, who he wrongly believed were harassing and
threatening him throughout the summer of 1842. His paranoia was all consum-
ing and, by January 1843, he began focussing his paranoia on Prime Minister Sir
Robert Peel, who had created the metropolitan police force. Instead of scrawling
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his delusions on a private gate, however, McNaughtan actually murdered the Prime
Minister’s press secretary, who he mistook for the Prime Minister, his real target.
The famous McNaughtan trial (1843)—presided over by three judges, one of
which, it should be noted, was Justice Coleridge—would end with McNaughtan
being sent not to prison but to Bethlem Hospital as he was found incapable of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong.19 There was much criticism of the trial, par-
ticularly from the House of Lords who requested that the judges clarify the
grounds by which someone could claim insanity as a defence for an illegal action,
resulting in the so-called McNaughtan Rules, but they proved to be not much
clearer in practice. However, the main litmus test for innocence on the basis of
“temporary delusion” became the “right–wrong test,” which suggested that the
accused could be found innocent only if the resulting illegal act from his or her
delusional state was believed to be morally justifiable by the accused.20 It is pure
conjecture to wonder whether or not Pooley would have been successful in mak-
ing an insanity plea, but it is worth noting that he surely believed that his actions
warning neighbours and family members about the evils of Christianity were
morally right even though such statements were illegal according to common law.
By suggesting that Pooley’s beliefs about Christianity were clear “delusions” and
his actions a result thereof, Holyoake was justified in wondering just what could be
motivating a judge to sentence a man to a year and nine months’ imprisonment for
what were essentially the diseased ramblings of an imbecile. Even delusional mur-
derers had gotten off with lighter sentences.
At the time, Buckle failed to notice that a poor, deluded man was found
guilty of blasphemy and sentenced to a prison term, though such an event certain-
ly seemed to support the underlying argument of his book: that while England
may be the most progressive of all nations, it still had some way to go before
reaching a truly scientific stage of progress. Buckle believed, following August
Comte, that nations tended to follow the same stages of development, from bar-
baric to metaphysical and from metaphysical to scientific. He was also greatly
influenced by that notorious “regularity salesman of the nineteenth century,”21
Adolphe Quetelet, who argued that sociological statistics were central in under-
standing the thoughts and deeds of the masses of society. Buckle sought to com-
bine these two approaches to the study of history in order to uncover the laws that
govern the progress of civilization.22 In doing so he hoped “to accomplish for
the history of man something equivalent … to what has been effected by other
inquirers for the different branches of natural science.”23 Indeed, by uncovering
the scientific processes of history, Buckle set about to play his own role in con-
tributing to England’s progress.
While Buckle claimed in the introduction of his work that the true task
of the scientific historian was to uncover laws by analyzing statistical data concern-
ing the great masses of society, the book itself focused on a very general law con-
cerning Buckle’s hypothesis about the progress of civilization. The progress of
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civilization, argued Buckle, could only be understood by examining the general
intellect of a given society. The “advance of civilization solely depends on the
acquisitions made by the human intellect, and on the extent to which those acqui-
sitions are diffused.” But it is only by doubting the contemporary state of knowl-
edge, that advancement will occur. “[I]t is evident,” according to Buckle, “that
until doubt began, progress was impossible.” Without doubt, in other words,
without a healthy dose of constant scepticism, society will stagnate and possibly
decline. “On this account it is, that although the acquisition of fresh knowledge
is the necessary precursor of every step in social progress, such acquisition must
itself be preceded by a love of inquiry, and therefore by a spirit of doubt; because
without doubt there will be no inquiry, and without inquiry there will be no knowl-
edge.” For Buckle, knowledge, and therefore progress, must be something that is
constantly sought after; it is a laborious process and requires “great sacrifice”.
“They who do not feel the darkness, will never look for the light.”24 According
to Buckle, there is a spirit of scepticism that is central in the progress of civiliza-
tion.
There is also, however, in any given society, a spirit of protection that
continues to embrace a stagnant way of thinking making the people “in politics
too confiding; in science too credulous; in religion too intolerant.”25 It is against
the protective spirit that the sceptic must battle in order for progress to occur.
Buckle’s history, then, does not read like an analysis of statistics as one might
expect from the methodological pronouncements of his introduction, but rather
like a Whiggish intellectual history where the protective spirit eventually gives way
to the sceptical in an analysis of the progress of science, religion, and politics in
Western Europe but in particular England and France. While Buckle proclaims
that his concern is only with the masses and the general intellectual spirit of the
day,26 his focus is almost entirely on the great sceptical individuals of the past that
he sees challenging the protective spirit, a spirit also represented by individuals.27
One of the main characters of the book actually appears as a representative of
both spirits, Edmund Burke.
Buckle, like many historians who have considered the life of Burke, split
his life between the young member of Parliament who fought against political cor-
ruption and defended many oppressed elements of English society, and the older
Burke who defended custom at the expense of reform and who seemingly
opposed the democratizing spirit he had at once so eloquently defended. Buckle
appreciated the younger Burke because he was a polymath who brought his vast
stores of knowledge to bear on a whole host of politically important issues that
helped guide English civilization during the reign of George III. “The studies of
this extraordinary man not only covered the whole field of political inquiry,”
argued Buckle, “but extended to an immense variety of subjects, which, though
apparently unconnected with politics, do in reality bear upon them as important
adjuncts”. According to Buckle, Burke had a “philosophic mind” meaning that he
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was able to light up “every branch of knowledge” by considering issues that
seemed at first quite remote from them. Because of his philosophical mind Burke
was able to influence a broad range of disciplines in English society from jurispru-
dence to fine art, from political economy to mechanical trades. “Such was the
strength and exuberance of his intellect, that it bore fruit in all directions, and
could confer dignity upon the meanest subjects, by showing their connexion with
general principles, and the part they have to play in the great scheme of human
affairs.”28
What Buckle most appreciated about the younger Burke, however, was
the way in which “he made his opinions subservient to the march of events”.
Burke recognized that the “object of government” was not the preservation of a
specific set of ideological principles but rather “the happiness of the people at
large”. He insisted above all “upon an obedience to the popular wishes, which no
statesmen before him had paid, and which with too many statesmen since have
forgotten.” Buckle argued that it was from such a general understanding of gov-
ernment and the role of the politician that Burke advocated “the freedom of
trade” while attacking “all similar prohibitions”, that he attacked religious intoler-
ance by supporting the petitions of Catholics and Dissenters against the restric-
tions impinged on their practice by the Church of England. He sought to “soft-
en the penal code” and “abolish the old plan of enlisting soldiers for life” while
attacking the slave trade and the growing power of judges. Burke quite simply
sought to raise the standard of political life and governance and Buckle was par-
ticularly pleased with the way in which Burke “raised his voice” against “those vul-
gar politicians”, those “feeble and shallow men” who still fill the benches of
England’s Parliament.29 From such a perspective, Buckle would have been partic-
ularly impressed with Burke’s role in the trial of the then Governor-General of
India, Warren Hastings, who was charged with high crimes and misdemeanours.
An eloquent Burke famously spent two days in February 1788 reading the various
charges against Hastings, making them on behalf of the peoples’ rights Hastings
had so clearly trampled and on behalf of humanity itself. The most memorable
part of the speech was the end when Burke read out a series of charges, each one
following the phrase “I impeach him [Hastings] in the name of….” For example:
“I impeach him in the name of the people of India, whose laws, rights and liber-
ties he has subverted; whose properties he has destroyed; whose country he has
laid waste and desolate. … I impeach him in the name of human nature itself,
which he has cruelly outraged, injured and oppressed, in both sexes, in every age,
rank, situation, and condition of life.”30
It was not long after the opening of the Hastings trial, however, that
other events thoroughly overcame the thoughts of the rapidly aging Burke.
“When the French Revolution broke out,” argued Buckle, Burke’s “mind, already
fainting under the weight of incessant labour, could not support the contempla-
tion of an event so unprecedented, so appalling, and threatening results of such
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frightful magnitude. … His mind, once so steady, so little swayed by prejudice and
passion, reeled under the pressure of events which turned the brains of thou-
sands.”31 Burke began to be not just prejudiced against the revolution, but against
France and the French people. He also began to argue quite clearly against princi-
ples he used to uphold, even advocating a punishing, long, and religiously motivat-
ed war against the revolution. Burke had quite simply been taken over by the pro-
tective spirit, the spirit that he had fought so long against during the reign of
George III. “Now he was a man after the king’s own heart.”32
The other great man to appear in Buckle’s History of Civilization was more
consistent in his ability to keep the sceptical spirit alive and what is more he did so
while being constantly persecuted for his beliefs. This, of course, was Voltaire.
Buckle was particularly taken with Voltaire because he published his critical works
in a nation when “the fate of nearly all the best literary productions of that time”
was that they were “publicly burned by the common hangman.”33 France, unlike
England in the eighteenth century, was without political freedom. “There was nei-
ther free press, nor free parliament, nor free debates.” The last “resources of lib-
erty” in France was thus literature itself. And while “the voice of liberty,” accord-
ing to Buckle, was “silenced in the state,” it “could only be heard in the appeals of
those great men, who, by their writings, inspired the people to resistance.”34
Voltaire was the greatest of those great men.
What Buckle appreciated about Voltaire was not just that he constantly
and against all odds defended such unpopular ideas as religious tolerance, rational
analysis, and freedom of thought and expression, but the way in which he defend-
ed his beliefs: he wrote histories. In his history of the Age of Louis XIV (1751),
for instance, Voltaire did not write about the life of a king and the courtly intrigues
of his rule, but rather of the age itself, of the beliefs of the age, of society, of cul-
ture. “It was in this way,” argued Buckle, “that Voltaire taught historians to con-
centrate their attention on matters of real importance, and to neglect those idle
details with which history had formerly been filled.” He wrote history very much
as Buckle sought to write history, not by concentrating on the activity of lords and
their wars but rather on “the steps by which men passed from barbarism to civi-
lization.”35 By showing his readers how society has slowly progressed from an era
that embraced superstitious beliefs to one that was beginning to embrace reason
and rationality, from one that accepted political and social suppression to one that
demanded liberty of thought and politics, Voltaire was doing a great service not
just to the study of history but to the cause of liberty in his own lifetime. It was
in this way that, according to Buckle, Voltaire was “the greatest historian Europe
has yet produced.”36
The language Voltaire employed in writing his histories was also an
important strategy, according to Buckle, in disseminating his views. Voltaire, it is
safe to say, had a way with words but he also understood that at times a rational
response to a violent enemy was of little value in a street brawl. Voltaire “had to
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deal with men impervious to argument; men whose inordinate reverence for antiq-
uity had only left them with two ideas, namely, that every thing old is right, and
that every thing new is wrong.” To argue rationally with such men would be point-
less. Voltaire instead appropriated less refined literary weapons in attacking ene-
mies of progress. “He, therefore, used ridicule, not as the test of truth, but as the
scourge of folly.” Voltaire was therefore able, “more than any other man[,] to sap
the foundation of ecclesiastical power, and to destroy the supremacy of classical
studies.” Because he relied not just on reason but also upon “irony,” “wit,” and
“pungent and telling sarcasms,” Voltaire “produced more effect than the gravest
arguments could have done”.37 These were lessons Buckle would not soon for-
get, and he would put them on public display in defending a poor well-sinker
against the protective spirit of his own day.
Buckle on Liberty and Blaspheme
Buckle would not learn of Pooley’s unfortunate trial and subsequent imprison-
ment until two years after the fact while he was in the midst of preparing to write
a review of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). Mill was an important influence
on Buckle’s work, particularly his analysis of scientific methods in his System of
Logic (1843), but given Buckle’s own arguments about the relationship between
progress and the increase of liberty of thought and expression, he greatly antici-
pated the publication of On Liberty. “If Mr. Mill’s forthcoming on ‘Liberty’ is what
I fully contemplate it will be,” Buckle wrote to his publisher John Parker, “it will
be intimately connected with some views of my own concerning the influence of
Legislation”. Buckle went on to say that should this be the case he would be more
than happy to review the book for Fraser’s Magazine, the monthly journal that
Parker happened to edit.38
When On Liberty was published a few months later, Buckle found that it
accorded to his way of thinking even more than he had anticipated. An episode
briefly recounted by Mill particularly caught Buckle’s attention. On 9 March 1859
he wrote to Parker of a case mentioned by Mill “of a person in 1857 being ‘gross-
ly insulted’ by a judge. Will you be kind enough to ascertain for me where I can
get a printed account of this in detail?”39 The case that so caught Buckle’s atten-
tion was of course that of Thomas Pooley. Mill mentions it only very briefly in
On Liberty, explaining that the sentencing of Pooley to “twenty-one months’
imprisonment for uttering and writing on a gate some offensive words against
Christianity” was clear evidence that “[p]enalties for opinion, or at least for its
expression, still exist by law” and that furthermore “their enforcement is not, even
in these times, so unexampled as to make it incredible that they may some day be
revived in full.”40 Buckle was astounded by this sorry if rather brief tale, and
sought to find out all that he could about the case, receiving, among other docu-
ments from Parker, Holyoake’s original pamphlet about the poor “Cornish Well-
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Sinker”.
It did not seem to matter, in Buckle’s mind, that Pooley received a par-
don from the Crown just five months into his sentence, largely as a result of
Holyoake’s initial intervention into the matter. Indeed, the law against blasphemy
still existed in the common law and a judge had felt it necessary in the first place
to put a man in prison for defying the law. A clear injustice had occurred and
Pooley’s subsequent pardon was not enough to right the wrong that had been
committed.
The first third of Buckle’s review of Mill’s On Liberty dealt with unpack-
ing much of Mill’s earlier work on Logic and contains rather tedious forays into
Mill’s consideration of the inductive and deductive scientific methods. This was
all done to explain just where On Liberty fit within Mill’s ever growing philosophi-
cal and political writings. The opinions expressed in On Liberty were only dis-
cussed in the middle third of the rather lengthy review while the case of Pooley
appeared in the final third following a discussion of the importance of freedom
of expression.
Buckle argued that both he and Mill believed that for society to progress,
“to recover new truths of real importance”, it was simply necessary to “vindicate
the right of each man to do what he likes, and to say what he thinks, to an extent
much greater than is usually supposed to be either safe or decent.” “[F]or the sake
of society”, argued Buckle, it was important to allow individuals the right to speak
against what the majority holds true, in part because what societies accept as
absolute truth in one era so often becomes patent falsehood in the next. “Nearly
every opinion held by the majority was once confined to the minority”, argued
Buckle. “Every established religion was once a heresy.”41 But allowing minority
views to be expressed in the public sphere was only one element of a progressive
society. He argued that it was just as important to contest precisely those opinions
that a majority of the population holds to be true. “On any subject,” argued
Buckle, “universal acquiescence always engenders universal apathy.” In order for
society to progress, in order for the sceptical spirit to stay alive, Buckle argued that
it was necessary to challenge truth in order to “prevent that truth from slumber-
ing. All hail to those bold and fearless natures, the heretics and innovators of their
day, who, rousing men out of their lazy sleep, sound in their ears the tocsin and
the clarion, and force them to come forth that they may do battle for their creed.
… Give us paradox, give us error, give us what you will, so that you save us from
stagnation.”42 From this perspective, On Liberty very much supported the most
basic argument of Buckle’s History of Civilization, that society only progresses
through the freedom to doubt while absolute certainty and the persecution of
doubt can only lead to stagnation and even decline.
Central to Buckle’s History of Civilization in England was that England had
progressed beyond any other nation in the world, that it allowed for the greatest
amount of freedom of action and expression, and that its great civilization as a
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whole was the result of such tolerance, particularly the tolerance shown towards
religious matters.43 Mill’s statements about the persecution of Pooley, however,
reminded Buckle how powerful the forces of religious intolerance still were and he
set out to relay his own findings about the case “so that men may determine
whether or not such things shall be allowed.”44
Buckle was, of course, quite sympathetic to the “common labourer” who
was well respected within the community for his “honesty, industry, and sobriety.”
Unfortunately, he was “eccentric” and “his mind was justly reputed to be disor-
dered.” He argued that despite the fact that Pooley’s “hallucinations” were “per-
fectly harmless” he made the mistake of writing “a few very silly words expressive
of his opinion respecting the potato-rot and the Bible, and also of his hatred of
Christianity.”45 A local clergyman made a formal complaint about Pooley’s words
and deeds and he was “summoned before a magistrate, who was likewise a clergy-
man. The magistrate, instead of pitying him or remonstrative with him, commit-
ted him for trial and sent him to jail.”46
In his description of the trial, Buckle highlighted the fact that the judge
and prosecutor were a father and son team who worked together to see that
Pooley, who was without counsel, would be found guilty by the jury. “The father
and the son performed their parts with zeal, and were perfectly successful” as
Pooley was found guilty. Most importantly, argued Buckle, the judge ignored the
obvious signs of Pooley’s insanity, “his restless manner, his wild and incoherent
speech, his disordered countenance and glaring eye…. But neither this, nor the fact
that he was ignorant, poor, and friendless, produced any effect upon that stony-
hearted man who now held him in his gripe.” Not only was Pooley sentenced to
twenty-one months in prison but the “interests of religion were vindicated.
Christianity was protected, and her triumph assured, by dragging a poor, harmless
and demented creature from the bosom of his family, throwing him into jail, and
leaving his wife and children without provision, either to starve or to beg.”47
Buckle explained that Pooley was later transferred to Bodmin asylum
because his condition worsened after a fortnight in prison. It was at this point
when “his misfortunes attracted the attention of a few high-minded and benevo-
lent men, who exerted themselves to procure his pardon”. Buckle argued that the
appeal for a pardon was successful only because the authorities wanted to avoid
the publicity that would have been generated should the appeal fail. “Happily for
mankind,” argued Buckle, “one vice is often balanced by another, and cruelty is
corrected by cowardice.” The authorities wanted to avoid “general exposure”
because they were involved in political affairs and “were, therefore, obliged to con-
sider expediency as well as justice.”48
Buckle would not let expediency get in the way of distributing out his
own justice, however. As he explained, “No writer on important subjects has rea-
son to expect that he can work real good, or that his words shall live, if he allows
himself to be trammelled by expediency as to postpone to it considerations of
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right, of justice, and of truth.” Buckle, now channelling the younger Burke and
his hero Voltaire while anticipating Zola’s later and more famous “J’accuse”,
argued that “a great crime has been committed, and the names of the criminals
ought to be known. They should be in everyone’s mouth. They should be bla-
zoned abroad, in order that the world may see that in a free country such things
cannot be done with impunity.” The real criminals must be punished, according
to Buckle. “And, surely, no punishment can be more severe than to preserve their
names.” Buckle went on to name the initial prosecutor who first lodged the com-
plaint against Pooley, he named the magistrate who committed Pooley to trial, and
he most importantly named the judge who sentenced Pooley to prison.
It was the last named Mr. Justice [John Taylor] Coleridge, who Buckle
held out for special punishment. “[W]ith Mr. Justice Coleridge we have a different
account to settle, and to him other language must be applied.”49 Superior judges
must be held to a higher standard than others, argued Buckle, because of the
immense authority that is entrusted to them. They must not misuse that authori-
ty, particularly by ferreting out “some obsolete law for the purpose of oppressing
the poor, when they know right well that the anti-Christian sentiments which that
law was intended to punish are quite as common among the upper classes as
among the lower”. Buckle’s point was that there was an unspoken class dimension
to blasphemy. Blasphemy was a charge that no magistrate would bring up against
a popular literary figure because of the publicity that would ensue, but trying a
poor sod like Thomas Pooley for the offence would avoid the publicity while
reminding the lower orders of the consequences for overstepping their bound-
aries. But of course Coleridge and his ilk would not dare to challenge one of the
literary unbelievers. They tremble at the thought. “Happily for mankind,” argued
Buckle, “literature is a real power, and tyranny quakes at it.” Yet literature must be
used not just to defend other men of letters, but “to defend the weak against the
strong, and to uphold the poor against the weak. …I would it were known in
every cottage, that the intellectual classes sympathize, not with the upper ranks but
with the lower. I would that we made the freedom of the people our first consid-
eration.” Only by defending the weak and the poor, argued Buckle, could litera-
ture become “the religion of liberty, and we, priests of the altar, ministering her
sacred rites, might feel that we act in the purest spirit of our creed when we
denounce tyranny in high places, when we chastise the insolence of offence, and
when we vindicate the cause of Thomas Pooley against Justice Coleridge.”50
The Aftermath
For someone who had never before written a review, Buckle did a remarkable job
getting his review noticed, though the attention had little to do with his opinions
about Mill’s On Liberty or even the way in which his view of the Pooley case relat-
ed to freedom of expression. His literary chastisement of the Justice John
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Coleridge was all anyone was talking about in reference to his review and the fact
that Buckle had failed to act like a gentleman in meting out his “justice”.
Just a few weeks after the publication of Buckle’s review, the weekly
Saturday Review expressed contempt for Buckle’s absurd and irresponsible diatribe
against a well-respected judge with an “unblemished character”. The Saturday (as
it was often called) admitted that perhaps Buckle had a point about the sentence
being “too severe”, but such was linked with “a string of unjust charges” that
Buckle “urged with an intemperance of language which nothing can excuse.” By
in particular suggesting that the father and son were somehow working together
in their persecution of Pooley, by implying that “there was a black conspiracy”
between them, Buckle was insinuating a state of affairs beyond the pale. “To base
the insinuation upon the relationship of the parties is to make it additionally offen-
sive; for to men with the feelings of gentlemen, that circumstance would in itself
form an additional motive against improper conduct. Mr. Buckle ought to have
been restrained from this remark, by his own sense of what is due from one gen-
tleman to another.”51 It was beyond reproach that Buckle would question the
professionalism of the two men and it was insulting not just to the immediate par-
ties, but to the “feelings and understandings of many hundreds of persons who
know and honour” Sir John Coleridge.52
The Christian Remembrancer was equally horrified by Buckle’s “angry” arti-
cle that was clearly written “with an intent to injure somebody.” It was not Sir
John Coleridge who Buckle damaged, however, but rather only himself. “Whether
regarded as one claiming to be an investigator of facts, an educated and well-
informed writer, or, lastly, a gentleman, he has given a blow to his reputation, from
which it must inevitably take a long time to recover.”53 Buckle had so “irrepara-
bly” damaged his reputation because he failed to act like a “gentleman” in this dis-
pute. It really should have been just “a matter of decent courtesy, to refrain from
imputing any man, above all, a man of high character and blameless life, that he
has acted upon the lowest and basest motives … for the purpose of oppressing a
poor and innocuous man whom he knew to be insane.” The Christian Remembrancer
felt little need to defend the well-respected judge but instead directed the reader to
the “June number of Fraser” which included a letter from John Duke Coleridge
about the trial. And unlike Buckle’s attacks, it was “a perfect model of high-toned
and righteous indignation”.54
The June 1859 issue of Fraser’s Magazine did indeed include a rather
lengthy response to Buckle’s accusations in the form of a letter to the editor writ-
ten by the prosecutor and son of Justice Coleridge. John Duke Coleridge began
his letter by suggesting that he need not tell the editor that Buckle’s attacks on his
father was “a libel, nor need I offer you any opinion as to the effect on the char-
acter of your Magazine of publishing a tissue of what I must call coarse personal
malevolence.” He argued that he would like to treat the libel “with the disdainful
silence which it deserves”, but he also admitted that some persons will likely read
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the review having no foreknowledge of his father and therefore may be taken in
by Buckle’s lies.55 Coleridge wanted, therefore, to set the record straight for those
necessarily ignorant readers while also expressing his disgust at the libellous accu-
sations.
Coleridge doubted that Buckle had actually looked into the facts of the
case. Had he done so he would have discovered that Pooley was not the harmless
well-respected neighbour presented in Buckle’s narrative of events. Pooley,
Coleridge argued, had been irritating his neighbours for at least fifteen years. His
blasphemous outbursts and graffiti was not the result of some recent accident,
which he admitted did occur, as Pooley had been annoying his neighbours for the
better part of his life in Liskeard. Not only was Pooley often warned about his
illegal statements, the advertisement taken out in the Cornish Times was actually a
message to Pooley that his actions would have consequences if they continued,
which they did.56
Coleridge sought to convince the reader that these were not the harmless
“silly words” suggested by Buckle but were rather “shockingly blasphemous”, so
much so that Coleridge refused to print them “not even in defence of my father”.
He suggested that it was “incredible” to him that “any man who knew the words
would describe them so inaccurately as Mr. Buckle has described them,” subtly
suggesting that either Buckle did not know the basic facts of the case or was
impervious to “shockingly blasphemous” statements and therefore an infidel him-
self. To further his case in this regard, Coleridge sent a copy of the blasphemous
statements to the editor of Fraser’s requesting that a note be appended to the pub-
lished letter explaining—in the editor’s own judgement—whether or not Pooley’s
statements were blasphemous. The editor did, in fact, append a note to the pub-
lished letter but it would have only partially satisfied Coleridge. The editor admit-
ted that he had “no hesitation in pronouncing [Pooley] guilty of blasphemy of the
grossest kind.” But he also suggested that the statements “bear—in our opinion
and in that of an eminent physician, well versed in mental science, whom we have
consulted on the subject—strongly marked, the semblance of insanity”.57
The appended note would not have pleased Coleridge because the other
key element in defending his father was his suggestion that Pooley exhibited no
signs of insanity at the trial, even though the nature of the blasphemous state-
ments in the mind of the editor and consulted physician suggested otherwise.
Coleridge argued, however, that blasphemous statements in themselves are not
evidence of insanity. Indeed, aside from what on the surface appear to be insane
considerations of Christianity, Pooley seemed at the trial entirely rational to the
judge, jury, and prosecution. Coleridge argued that Pooley defended himself not
just rationally but even admirably, as he cross-examined “several of the witnesses
who proved his writing with a good deal of skill”.58 Coleridge even remembered
Pooley “shrewdly pointing out that a Christian jury was an unfair tribunal to sit up
his case, as any juryman would feel, if he was indicted for maintaining Christianity
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in an infidel country, and was tried in an infidel court.”59 The trial itself gave no
indication of his supposed madness, in other words, and no one came forward to
suggest such a defence for him.
Much as had the Saturday Review and the Christian Remembrancer, Coleridge
reserved his harshest words in order to reject the supposed suggestion that he and
his father formed some sort of conspiracy out to get Pooley. Not only had Buckle
no right to make such an accusation about two men he did not know but he also
clearly “does not comprehend the common feelings of a gentleman, nor the first
principles which actuate the high profession to which it is my pride and honour to
belong.” Coleridge expressed absolute disgust that “Mr. Buckle should have made
such a charge without evidence and without inquiry” and suggested that such
could only be “proof that his learning … is not education, and has not raised him
above the feelings and prejudices of a thoroughly vulgar mind.”60 He also
expressed disgust that this was a charge that needed to be addressed. “It is hard
that a gentleman should have to touch such dirty stuff as this.”61
Interestingly, Buckle had already articulated responses to criticisms of
this nature in letters to his friends who did not approve of his attack on Coleridge.
The most extensive exchange was with Buckle’s closest correspondent, the propo-
nent of female education, Emily Shirreff. She wrote to him—before any of the
attacks against him had been published—that she “regretted the extreme violence”
of his assault and questioned the language he used which she claimed was not
“gentlemanly”.
Buckle explained that he used such violent language because he believed
that Coleridge’s “sentence on Pooley is the most criminal act by any English judge
since the seventeenth century.” He had no choice but to express contempt
towards the sentence and the judge who carried it out because it ran “counter to
the liberal tendencies of the time, in order to gratify that malignant passion—a
zeal for protecting religion.”62 Given the heinous crime committed by Coleridge
in sentencing a harmless man to twenty-one months’ imprisonment Buckle argued
that he could not “use nice and dainty words. Instead of confining myself to writ-
ing like a gentleman, I aimed at writing like a man.” Buckle claimed that he set out
to “smite” Coleridge for his actions. “Had I, or had I not, a right to smite him? Is
it the business of literature to chastise as well as to persuade? I think it is; and I
follow the example of many who have done the greatest good and left the great-
est names.” Buckle refused to accept a situation where, “as an author”, he should
feel compelled to act as a gentleman in the face of a great injustice. “[W]hen an
act of cruelty comes across my path, perpetrated by a powerful and influential
man, I will never let conventional and ‘gentlemanly’ considerations restrain the
indignation which I feel.”63
Much of Buckle’s defence of his actions to his friends such as Shirreff
would be more formally articulated in a response to John Duke Coleridge’s letter
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to the editor. Fraser’s Magazine would not publish Buckle’s response, however.
Parker wanted to get the controversy off Fraser’s pages and agreed to publish
Buckle’s response in a pamphlet which meant that it would find a smaller reader-
ship.64 A Letter to a Gentleman Respecting Pooley’s Case was published at the end of
June 1859.65
Buckle argued in his Letter to a Gentleman that for the most part Coleridge
successfully defended himself against charges that Buckle did not make, such as
the issue of a supposed conspiracy, while passing over his main complaints in
absolute silence. The fact of the matter was that Coleridge, in Buckle’s mind at
least, gave no justification for the severity of the sentence nor did he mention the
terms of the sentence. “I charged Sir John Coleridge with passing a sentence
which, independently of the other objections against it, was alien to the spirit of
the age. To this I find no reply.”66 Buckle argued that the suggestion that Justice
Coleridge had no choice but to try and sentence Pooley was ridiculous. “Unhappy
judge! he had no choice. His hands were tied.” Buckle felt embarrassed to have to
explain to a barrister that “an assize is rarely held without an instance of the judge
imposing a light … sentence” particularly when the common law in question “was
established in a barbarous and ignorant age…. To suppose that an English judge
is bound to follow with servile acquiescence all the decisions of such a period, is
to suppose what is not only absurd in itself, but is contradicted by the judicial his-
tory of this country.”67
Buckle understood, however, that the main complaint against him was
not his accusations that a great miscarriage of justice had occurred, but that he
failed to act like a gentleman in discussing the case and used a forceful language
not suitable to such a public forum and certainly not suitable in reference to a
respectable English judge. This complaint, Buckle responded, was not unlike the
charge Pooley was forced to endure, that he should not be allowed to speak his
mind when it came to religion in the same way Buckle should not be allowed to
speak freely about the very public actions of an English judge. At issue in both
cases, argued Buckle, was “the sacred cause of liberty and of publication”, an issue
that “lies near to my heart.” This was an issue that was at the centre of “a far older
and wider struggle” occurring throughout the civilized world.
In every part of the civilized world the same contest is raging, and the 
question is still undecided, whether or not men shall say what they like;
in other words, whether language is to be refuted by language, or whether
it is to be refuted by force. Disguise it as you will, this is the real issue.
In this great warfare between liberty and repression, Sir John Coleridge
has chosen his side and I have chosen mine. But he, being armed with 
the power of the executive government, has been able to carry matters
with a high hand, and to strengthen his party, not indeed by arguments,
but by violence. Instead of refuting, he imprisons. My weapons are of
another kind, and shall I not use them?  Am I for ever to sit in silence?
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Are all the blows to be dealt from one side, and none from the other?  I
think not. I think it is right and fitting that Sir John Coleridge, and those
who agree with him, should be taught that literature is able to punish as
well as to persuade, and that she never exercises her high vocation with 
dignity than when, upholding the weak against the strong, she lets the 
world see that she is no respecter of persons, but will, if need be, strike
at the highest place, and humble the proudest name.68
Buckle was not simply attacking a judge for over-sentencing a deluded mad man.
He was defending the right of liberty of expression and indeed was defending the
sceptical spirit of his own age against the protective spirit of a bygone era repre-
sented by Coleridge and the medieval law against blaspheme that he so clearly
upheld with his ruling.
Remembering the Pooley Controversy
While Buckle may have successfully defended his choice of literary weapons in
smiting Justice Coleridge, he was at the time unable to convince the wider public
about the validity of his attacks, in large part because his Letter to a Gentleman had
such a limited circulation. In hindsight, however, it is clear that Buckle engendered
a conversation about blaspheme that might not have otherwise occurred. John
Duke Coleridge was forced to defend his persecution of blaspheme by citing the
work of Thomas Starkie, which in theory justified the continued persecution of a
more narrow form of blaspheme that was particularly malicious and vulgar as
opposed to more serious literary criticisms of Christianity which should not be
persecuted.69 But others less polarizing than Buckle also began questioning the
law. Buckle sent his initial review of On Liberty to James Fitzjames Stephen who
would become one of the most influential legal theorists of the Victorian peri-
od.70 He published an important essay that not only questioned the law against
blaspheme itself, but also systematically took apart the favoured Starkie defence of
the law. Relying on a similar rationale as Buckle without the rhetorical display,
Stephen argued that there was a class dimension masked by Starkie’s narrowing of
the law that essentially legalized blasphemy for those able to articulate their anti-
Christian sentiments while vulgar and inarticulate anti-Christian statements such as
that made by Pooley would always appear “malicious” and therefore illegal under
the law.71 After a few highly publicized cases against blaspheme in 1883 against
G. W. Foote and the Freethinker, the law once again went into disuse before finally
being repealed in the twentieth century.72 Buckle’s very public intervention played
no small role in this final chapter of the blaspheme law in England.73
Perhaps not surprisingly Buckle’s intervention in the Pooley case began
to be viewed in a more positive light as the nineteenth century progressed. When
the Life and Writings of Henry Thomas Buckle by Alfred Henry Huth was published
in 1880, the better part of a chapter was devoted to the “Case of Thomas Pooley”
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inclusive of many excerpts of letters about the case as well as a useful summary of
the case itself. Huth deemed the episode as “the most important in Buckle’s pub-
lic life” and, as is to be expected from a friendly biographer, was highly sympathet-
ic.74 Tellingly, reviewers of the two-volume work were also drawn to that impor-
tant episode in Buckle’s life and their interpretation likely gives a better sense of
contemporary views.
G. A. Simcox, writing for the Fortnightly Review, argued that Buckle’s
review of Mill’s On Liberty, was “still memorable for the grotesque, pathetic, elo-
quent philippic on Pooley’s case.” Simcox believed that it was still unclear just who
“we are to be indignant at”, whether the obvious “miscarriage of justice that the
judge did not find out that Pooley was mad,” and “perhaps the law under which
he was sentenced,” or perhaps Pooley who was likely sentenced to less of a term
than most poachers and yet he was surely “as great a nuisance as a poacher in a
respectable neighbourhood.” Buckle also seemed to be “in a state of exaltation
where he had too little sense of the proportion of things to measure the person-
al responsibility of the judge”. But, Simcox had to admit, Buckle “saw correctly
that while damaging his own position he was doing something to make further
prosecutions for blasphemy difficult, and he had the sense to turn a deaf ear to
the many letters from people with grievances that poured in upon him.”75
The New Quarterly Review was more unequivocal in its interpretation of
the case of Pooley which was indicative of Buckle’s “strong sense of justice which
he combined with … kindliness”. Much like Simcox, the New Quarterly Review was
glad that Buckle refused to listen to his “friends who urged him to calmer lan-
guage.” Buckle was right to attack the “perversion of justice with anger” and sug-
gested that it was John Duke (now Lord) Coleridge who should have kept quiet.
“The present Lord Coleridge published a defence of his father, and shared the dis-
grace of a religious persecution.” Whereas Buckle’s “righteous indignation” was
properly “aroused by an unjust sentence,” Coleridge’s letter was “an unworthy
defence of an indefensible act.”76
The Examiner was similar in its praise arguing that while Buckle’s lan-
guage might have been hyperbolic, “his indignation was righteous and generous.”
The reviewer went on to question that if we can praise Voltaire for defending
heretics, “[w]hy not Buckle for protesting against the unjust imprisonment of an
unfortunate lunatic who had got the idea into his head that the ashes of Bibles
would prove a cure for the potato rot?”77 While this was a view not likely to find
many adherents in 1859, it was widely shared by 1880.
The only noted review of Huth’s Life and Writings that does not in some
way defend Buckle’s actions against Coleridge is the Saturday Review, the weekly that
was the first to come out strongly against Buckle in 1859. Unlike the other
reviews, however, the Pooley episode was glossed over without much being said
for or against Buckle. The Saturday was only willing to suggest that the case of
Thomas Pooley resulted in “many articles, pamphlets, and a confused controver-
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sy.” Rather than pass judgment, however, it was deemed “better not to rake up
that old story.”78
Even if the Saturday did not want to “rake up that old story,” the histori-
an presented by the reviewer was very different than the man the weekly
denounced twenty-one years before. This was because Huth showed that Buckle
was not the arrogant and vulgar abuser who was too easily stereotyped as such in
the defences of Coleridge written in the wake of Buckle’s initial review of Mill.
Buckle was deeply principled and believed that he was fighting—in both his History
of Civilization and in his defence of Poole—to keep the sceptical spirit of the age
alive against the forces of custom and protection. It is in his letters where this is
perhaps most clear, especially his letter to Emily Shirreff where he attempts to
convince his friend that he has no personal animosity towards Justice Coleridge.
“On my part there is no personal feeling, no rivalry, no jealousy; but I felt great
indignation. I believed that the indignation ought to be expressed; and I knew that
many who agreed with me would shrink from compromising themselves, and
incurring the hostility of Coleridge’s numerous and powerful friends.”79 Buckle
was willing to put his newly established reputation at great risk in order to defend
Pooley and with him the liberty of expression and thought, a reputation that
was certainly for a time “irreparably” damaged in the words of the Christian
Remembrancer.80
Huth’s study made it clear that Buckle was well prepared to accept the
consequences for speaking out so violently against a public figure. Those conse-
quences were particularly harsh in part because Buckle was not just a man of let-
ters, but a historian. This was a period when historians were claiming authority,
much like men of science, on their ability to overcome their subjective identity in
order to let the past (or ‘nature’ in the case of men of science) speak for itself.81
Controversy, in particular, was viewed as anathema to the new disinterested histor-
ical identity. William Stubbs, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford
(1866–83), spoke for many of his colleagues when he said in a lecture that “Of all
things in the world except a controversial woman, a controversial boy is the most
disagreeable”.82 Buckle was not the only historian who suffered because of a
public controversy. James Anthony Froude, author of a very popular History of
England (1856–70), could never escape his earlier life as a controversial (and hereti-
cal) novelist, and his histories were attacked throughout his adult life as the prod-
uct of a weak and inherently subjective mind.83 Posterity has been kinder to
Froude’s historical studies than it has been to Buckle’s, but the memory of Buckle’s
intervention against Coleridge has for the most part been a positive one despite
the early consensus that deemed it libellous.
Buckle not only jeopardized his authorial reputation in defending Pooley;
he also jeopardized his health. In the words of the now rather sympathetic
Saturday Review, Buckle had a “kind heart and a large intellect cramped in a feeble
body”.84 Indeed, he struggled to produce what he could against the demands of
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his sickness throughout his short adult life. His health went into serious decline
just as he began his review of Mill’s On Liberty, and he admitted to Parker that he
wished he had not proposed to write the review in the first place as it had taken a
severe toll. He would eventually, much like Byron’s Gladiator, “consent to death”
in 1862 while in Beirut trying to find a warmer climate more suitable to his sick-
ness, but not before he avenged Thomas Pooley and attempted to play his own
role in keeping the sceptical spirit alive like the handful of great men who appear
in his History of Civilization in England. Before he died Buckle told Alfred Huth’s
father Henry, in reference to his defence of Pooley, that “I have not done anything
in my life on which I look back with greater satisfaction than this”.85 By 1880
there were more than a few who would have agreed with him. Surely there are
more now.
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